The Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS, continue to burn through the lifetime of their fighter aircraft in the war against Ukraine. After two years of air warfare, its total strength is slightly less than 75% of its pre-war strength.
VKS lost instantly about 16 fighters in the last eight months. However, this does not take into account imputed losses, which result from the fact that an aircraft accumulates more flight hours than planned, reducing its overall useful life. Based on updated information, the VKS is on track to suffer approximately 60 presumed aircraft losses this year from overuse. This equates to the loss of 26 new aircraft. Meanwhile, VKS currently procures only about 20 total Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft per year.
The air war has mostly maintained a steady state since mid-2023, with the exception of February 2024, when the VKS it flew about 150 sorties a day to support the Avdiivka offensive. Since Russia also uses longer-range glide bombs and has dedicated more aircraft to air-to-ground roles, the average flight duration has likely decreased, reducing accelerated aging. However, slightly more than half of VKS’ regular aircraft are over 30 years old. they have much less flying hours.
Accelerated aging may shape Russia’s military operations. The majority of VKS fighters operating (and losing) over the Ukraine are the newer Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft with occasional Su-25 sightings reported.
Older MiG-31s and Su-27s have been relegated to Kinzhal supersonic strike support and air patrol at a distance. With estimated average airframe lives of less than 20% and 35% respectively, these older aircraft are serviceable for this war, but likely do not have sufficient life to support the Russian possible future invasions.
Russia’s air-to-air MiG-29s are completely absent, even from air patrol missions. Given their age, these aircraft may either be decommissioned or in reserve for a final mission. Whether due to lack of upgrades, survivability, or age, these are essentially paper planes.
Su-24s, on the other hand, were used extensively in the invasion of Ukraine. But there have been no reports of Su-24 losses so far in 2024. How much are they still flying? These aircraft are old. the newer models were it was manufactured in 1993. VKS may have chosen not to configure them for the new FAB-1500 glide bombs, which would also imply that the Su-24s may be reaching the end of their useful life.
Ukraine, where it is small for air defense munitions, it has a few options to accelerate Russian air losses. Attacking air bases would likely reduce VKS sortie rates by more than 20% by disrupting operations and forcing the VKS to fly from more distant bases. The biggest opportunity remains the effect of impending F-16 jets (and possible Gripens) to divert VKS outputs from ground attack to air-to-air efforts.
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Regardless, more munitions and air defense fighters will be critical to Ukraine’s success. Russia relies on only about 300 combined Su-30, Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft for its operations over Ukraine, including delivery extremely destructive glide bombs. From a strategic perspective, downing these newer VKS aircraft imposes a greater cost on Russia and would have the greatest overall impact on the VKS’s ability to conduct strikes. It will also improve his chances of survival 45 allied F-16s were promised to Ukraine.
VKS has fewer than 650 operational aircraft when counting end-of-life aircraft. it has even less when rapid usage is taken into account. But these numbers are unlikely to change its behavior, based on Russia’s demonstrated willingness to accept high losses for even small gains.
By comparison, NATO has about 800 fifth-generation aircraft, with another 100 or more arriving each year. This is more than enough to counter VKS in the air and conduct targeted ground strikes, especially given the poor performance of Russian surface-to-air missiles in Ukraine.
Certainly, NATO should expand production of air-to-air and surface-to-air munitions to deter further Russian aggression and support Ukraine. But with the VKS currently shrinking, the alliance can afford to donate more munitions to Ukraine now without worrying about its immediate strategic stockpiles.
Michael Bohnert is an engineer at the Rand think tank. He previously worked as an engineer for the US Navy and the Naval Nuclear Laboratory.
Read the original at Defence247.gr
