With rumors swirling that Russia will immediately acquire hundreds of ―armed and unarmed‖ drones from Iran, the question inevitably arises of how Moscow plans to use them in Ukraine.
When the White House publicized the purported – until now – purchase in mid-July, Samuel Bendett of the Center for Naval Analyzes made the reasonable assumption that the procurement would include kamikaze drones.
“One of the biggest lessons the Russians learned from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war was that the massive use of mobile weapons systems is the key to military success,” he tweeted. In that war, in the fall of 2020, Azerbaijan used Israeli-made Harops to destroy Armenia’s S-300 air defense missile systems; the same type of long-range, Soviet-era mobile system Ukraine is using today against the Russians intruders.
Is Russia looking to repeat Azerbaijan’s success using Iranian-made drones? Does Tehran have drones as sophisticated as Harop to sell to Moscow?
“Iran has thoroughly studied drone technology over the past 20 years, and has developed its own – different from US and Israeli drones – technology when given the chance,” Bendett told me.
“Even if their cruise munitions do not exactly meet Harop’s specifications, they can still be compatible, given that Iran has a wide range of cruise munitions,” he added.
James Rogers, Associate Professor of Military Sciences at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU), pointed out that Iranian drones, such as the Ra’ad 85, “have a shorter range and less flight time compared to the Israeli Harop that the Azeris used in the war of 2020”.
“However, the Iranian systems are said to be capable of operating in an electronic warfare environment and have the ability to engage larger – either fixed or mobile – targets,” he pointed out. “Iran also has the rugged Ababil III drones, which have been used as roving munitions that explode in mid-air and hit senior military personnel.”
Rogers believes that it will be difficult for Russia to repeat the “technical success” of the Azeri Harop against the Armenian S-300, using Iranian drones.
“Harops have a long communication and navigation range, twice that of Iran’s Ra’ad 85 and Ababil III systems, and are generally considered more reliable,” he said. “On the front roving munitions are usually deployed in a rudimentary ‘swarm’ formation in saturation attacks against the enemy.”
“If used in this way, Iranian drones can play an important role on the battlefield,” he stressed.
Bendett pointed out that the Russians are not only concerned about the Ukrainian S-300s, but also about the recently acquired US HIMARS surface-to-surface multiple rocket launchers.
“Practically all Ukrainian long-range strike forces can be targeted by the Russians, who have advanced technology such as loitering drones (either theirs or Iranian),” he stressed.
During the hostilities in Yemen, the Houthi rebels used the Qasef-1/2K drone – a clone of the Iranian Ababil II – against Saudi air defenses. Using open-source GPS coordinates for the positions of the Saudi MIM-104 Patriot arrays, the Qasef drones hit the radar. The Houthis then fired waves of rockets at Saudi targets.
“The Houthis were hitting fixed targets with the Qasef, so any Ukrainian fixed military asset – from a missile array to a warehouse – is in the Russian crosshairs,” Bendett said.
Rogers estimates that Russia will use Iranian drones “as non-state entities in the Middle East have already done.”
“Iranian stray munitions have appeared in a swarm formation,” he said. “This happens when several drones are sent simultaneously to the same target with the mission of destroying enemy air defenses.”
Such a tactic does not deviate significantly from the tactic Russia has followed so far on the airwaves.
“Russia is known to have done something similar with its air force to hit Ukrainian defenses,” Rogers added.
“When the two schools of thought on the Air Force combine, then we are likely to see Russia use Iranian drones in saturation strikes against Ukrainian targets.”
Bendett expects Moscow to use different tactics “to neutralize Ukrainian fixed and mobile targets: from soldiers, weapons systems and mobile Artillery and Engineer units to port facilities, warehouses and command and control centers”.
“Russia studied Azerbaijan’s dominance in the Nagorno-Karabakh war very seriously and learned an important lesson from this conflict: the key to victory in the modern form of warfare is roving munitions and drones,” Bendett stressed.
And he concluded: “Thus, if and when this technology is procured, Russia gains a significant air advantage that it will use against Ukrainian forces.”
