The crisis caused around Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi’s visit is only one link in the long chain of US-China confrontation. For seventy years, the status of the de facto autonomous island claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has remained deliberately unclear, based on the American policy of strategic ambiguity.
It is a doctrine of double deterrence, with which the US seeks to prevent the forcible annexation of Taiwan by China, but at the same time to discourage Taipei from declaring independence. Chinese officials fear that, amid heightened Sino-US rivalry, the visit by the speaker of the House of Representatives is a sign of a gradual US move towards a more aggressive stance and active support for Taiwan.
China’s reaction is not only completely expected, but also mandatory from Beijing’s point of view. Despite overt threats to the US, the Chinese authorities did not prevent Nancy Pelosi from visiting Taiwan and exposed herself to the eyes of Chinese citizens. Characteristic is the outburst of nationalistic hysteria on Chinese social media, with cries that Pelosi’s plane was too bad not to be shot down.
Therefore, the large-scale air and naval exercises in which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is engaged these days constitute a deliberate display of “anger”, aimed at entertaining unfavorable impressions of Beijing’s damaged credibility both abroad and at home. inside the country. At the same time, however, these exercises give the Chinese armed forces a prime opportunity to prepare for a future attack on Taiwan. The massive invasion of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) by fighter jets, the suffocating naval blockade of the island and the testing of missile systems constitute a complex cross-branch exercise valuable to the untried LAS that has no real combat experience after the conflict with Vietnam in 1979.
However, as much as the tension surrounding Taiwan has its own communicative and military expediency for Beijing, most analysts believe that this development does not necessarily portend a landing operation on the autonomous island in the near future. As for the duration of the crisis, the prevailing view is that Beijing will continue to display its “fury” at least until the upcoming 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), where President Xi Jinping is expected to be re-elected for a third consecutive term.
The military exercises are then likely to give way to a wide range of economic and diplomatic moves by the Chinese leadership, targeting both Taiwan and the US and its allies. The DPRK has already announced a series of reprisals regarding its relations with the US, such as the suspension of dialogue with Washington on security issues, but also regarding dealing with the climate crisis. And Taiwan will suffer economic sanctions that will put it in a difficult position due to its dependence on the Chinese market.
Ultimately, however, Beijing-Taipei relations are not only determined by the Sino-American confrontation or the operational and broader political-economic dimensions of a possible LAS attack on Taiwan. An important parameter in this complex equation is Taiwan itself, with 23 million inhabitants, a democratic government and a very advanced economy. For the past three decades or so, profound changes have been taking place in the autonomous island’s own society, with the result that the mental gap between Taiwan and mainland China is constantly widening.
After China’s civil war and for about half a century the island was ruled with an iron fist by the defeated Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang – KMT), with the declared goal of reunification with the PRC. However, incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) appears to have a stronger base and represents sections of society with a national consciousness different from that of China. In the 26 years since the first free presidential elections in 1996, the KMT has been in power for 12 years and the DPP for 14, so far. According to recent polls, up to two-thirds of citizens identify themselves as “Taiwanese”, while less than 30% choose the dual identity of Taiwanese/Chinese. A paltry 2% self-identify as Chinese.
Relations between Beijing and Taipei deteriorated markedly after the unrest in Hong Kong in 2019 and the de facto – though not official – cancellation of the “one country, two systems” doctrine by the Chinese authorities. The subjugation of the previously autonomous and liberal enclave to Beijing’s jurisdiction was the tombstone to plans for a peaceful return of Taiwan to the core of the PRC with a separate status. The ignominious end of the doctrine of “one country, two systems” was one of the main reasons for the triumphant re-election of current President Tsai Ing-wen in January 2020.
Everything shows that this crisis will last longer and may take on wider dimensions. Beijing’s non-negotiable goal of annexing Taiwan is a cornerstone of the CCP’s narrative of rebirth of the Chinese nation. Given the DPRK’s economic slowdown, the country’s leadership is increasingly drawn to nationalist rhetoric. And the more Taiwan appears to be moving away from Beijing’s vision of reunification, the more likely it is to attempt a military takeover.
It seems, therefore, that finding a peaceful solution to this complex issue will be extremely difficult and the scenarios for military conflict in the region are multiplying. There is no shortage of estimates on the possible timing of a landing of Chinese armed forces in Taiwan, since Beijing’s determination is not in doubt. Western analysts’ views vary and point to a few years from now to the middle of the next decade.
It remains to be seen whether these estimates are accurate. The success of the LAS against a well-armed Taiwan cannot be taken for granted, nor can the international implications of such a conflict be accurately predicted. But the steady deterioration of Sino-US relations, as well as the importance Beijing attaches to China’s “national integration,” increasingly underscore the slide toward the prospect of an attack on Taiwan rather than its peaceful reunification with the PRC. A perspective very likely, if not definitive, in the long run.
