Today, after more than 30 years since the start of the process in the first place and in the second year of autonomous development and manufacturing – mass production of ballistic missiles by Turkey, the threat has now assumed extremely alarming proportions for Greece.
The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) itself is unable or unwilling to provide any kind of substantial guarantee to Greece. So one would expect Greece, in the first phase, to turn to Europe for the modernization and upgrading of the missile artillery. Ballistic missile options may not be available since both France and Germany rely on the US MLRS (M-270).
However, there are expensive, but existing and sufficient alternatives in the area of cruise missiles such as SCALP-EG/SCAL Naval (MdcN) and KEPD 350, but also in new ground launch systems for such weapons. One would therefore expect the Greek side to have primarily expressed an interest in participating in the JFS-M program and in a second year to do what Turkey is also doing…
In other words, to turn to friendly or allied countries that have ballistic missile development and production programs, with the aim of ensuring the fastest possible range and precision attack weapons. So far he has not done so with all that entails. Because even the creation of a complete anti-ballistic umbrella cannot ensure effective deterrence for Greece.
The countries with which there could be immediate cooperation in this field are Serbia and India. Starting from the first options are available although they are limited. The system that would, or should, interest Greece is Shumadia. It is a multiple rocket launcher (MLRS) type Jerina 1 and Jerina 2.
The first is 400 mm in diameter, INS (inertial) guidance and a range of 285 km. Four such rockets weighing 1,550 kg each can be used by the system, or up to 12 Jerina 2, with a diameter of 262 mm and a range of 70 km. Jerina 1’s explosive fragmentation warhead (charge) weighs 200 kg.
Regarding attack accuracy a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of 150 meters is reported with inertial guidance only. Accuracy increases dramatically (CEP 50 meters) when INS guidance is combined with GPS guidance. For the Jerina 2 there is a choice of an explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 110 kg, or a cluster warhead with 288 KB-2 bombs. The launcher of the system is installed on a Kamaz type 8X8 vehicle. The same one used for the NORA B52 type self-propelled gun that Cyprus has also acquired.
The Shumadia system, in addition to the co-production possibilities it will bring to Greece, is considered to be one of the most economical and efficient replacement solutions for the M-270 MLRS system, in case the latter are not modernized. It is also one of the most economical, efficient and quantitatively sufficient solutions for equipping all the large islands of the central and eastern Aegean.
In any case ballistic missiles like the 500 km range PrSM, it is extremely doubtful that they will be released in Greece. And this is something that is written based on the experience to date and also the fact that the US has not released such weapons to Turkey either. may the developments disprove us…
Therefore, Greece needs perhaps more than anything else, sufficient quantitative and effective missile artillery, to create denial and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles in the Aegean and of course to ensure real deterrence credibility against Turkey. From then on, at a purely sub-strategic level and copying the Turkish choices and actions, the Greek side has the alternative of examining the purchase of Indian surface-to-surface missile systems.
India with mainly Russian assistance has developed and put into service short, medium and long range missile systems. The Prithvi family of ballistic missiles has a range of up to 600 kilometers (Prithvi III/SS-350) and is flanked in the Indian armed forces by the medium and long range Agni missile family. There is therefore great scope for cooperation in this field with India, given the ever-expanding relationship of understanding between Athens and New Delhi.
For the BrahMos hypersonic anti-ship missile, no further analysis is needed since DP has made dozens of tributes and references to this weapon and its evolution to date in its various versions. Of course, the Israeli LORA ballistic missile could be added to the Greek alternatives. It remains to be proven in practice whether Israel is really willing to release critical weapons and systems to Greece.
As of this writing, absolutely nothing that has passed the Special Standing Committee on Armaments Programs and Contracts of the Hellenic Parliament (SPICE, Rampage, SPIKE N-LOS collections) has been contracted. Therefore, the strategic cooperation and relationship between the two states remains to be evaluated on the basis of the vital importance for the Greek deterrent power of this base.
SOURCE: defense-point.gr
