GlobalEye for PA: Why is its purchase from Greece called “OVERRIDED”?

The following article is a product of the commentary in the recent DR feature on the need for an immediate FOS contract signing in conjunction with an upgrade for the Air Force’s EMB-145H Erieye, alongside the acquisition of additional new generation GlobalEye systems from the Swedish SAAB (https://defensereview .gr/globaleye-aewc-for-hellenic-air-force/). We consider this specific issue crucial for Greek deterrence. Maximally. That’s why we’re coming back to see it from a completely different angle. The purely business one.

We’ll rely on the power of the image, as we’ve detailed everything about the capabilities of the EMB-145H Erieye and GlobalEye through a series of featurettes. The first thing we have to point out is that as a platform Bombardier’s Global 6000 provides clearly greater capabilities than the EMB-145. The former’s maximum takeoff weight reaches 99,500 pounds (about 45 tons), while the Brazilian plane’s maximum takeoff weight is 46,275 pounds (about 21 tons). The fuel load in the former reaches 44,700 pounds (20,275 kg) and in the latter 9,100 pounds (4,100 kg approximately).

Therefore the autonomy together with the radius in the Global 6000 carrier of the Erieye ER, are much larger in numbers. The radius of the Canadian plane reaches 5,900 nautical miles (10,900 km) and the ERJ-145 approximately 2,300 km. Accordingly, the autonomy (time remaining in the air) is set at 11 and five hours respectively. GlobalEye therefore, in addition to the larger detection radii of the Erieye XR, also ensures significantly greater operational flexibility.

On the other hand, like the ERJ-145, it can operate from all the same airports, including those in western Greece (Corfu, Ioannina, Agrinio, Preveza, Araxos, Andravida, Kalamata, Kefalonia, Zakynthos), outside the radius of Turkish ballistic missiles. In times of crisis, therefore, the Air Force can maintain an ASEPE in the air throughout the twenty-four hours, provided that it reactivates all four EMB-145H and has an equal number of GlobalEyes with at least 50% availability for both types.

It is worth noting here that the number of aircraft we mention is not excessive in the sense that there should always be one aircraft available (one of each type) for crew training and standby services. Therefore, the purchase of at least two GlobalEyes from Greece, only as irrational, cannot be perceived as an action. The map below shows the target detection radius of 400 kilometers and the areas covered by GlobalEye’s ErieEye XR flying on the axis Chania – Athens – Thessaloniki and vice versa.

The blue lines are 400 km from the red lines which depict the patrol route (with huge safety margins) of GlobalEye. The detection distance of aircraft the size of an F-16 fighter by the EriEye XR is given at 450 kilometers by the Swedes!

Approximately the same target detection distances are also ensured by upgrading the EriEye radar of the EMB-145H, based on the – admittedly scanty – data that the Swedes have made public. It should also be taken into account that such an aircraft, either the old or the newer GlobalEye, operating from the airports of Crete can provide absolute coverage and coordination of air operations in Cyprus.

It is therefore clearly a better choice to spend 680 million euros to buy two GlobalEyes, rather than 380 for three MQ-9Bs. Yes, these are different systems that have different roles, but this is where the return on investment is looked at. It is preferable in the opinion of the DR (https://defencereview.gr/mq9b-seaguardian-ena-panakrivo-meso-epitirisis-de/) to buy more unmanned platforms of similar or even slightly inferior capabilities with a clearly lower price and an interdisciplinary role , rather than just three Sea Guardians with only some of GlobalEye’s capabilities.

The enormous operational footprint and advantage of the EMB-145H and GlobalEye, which is the whole point of any reference to these systems – power multipliers though, can be seen in all their dimensions in the SAAB illustration below. Compared to ground-based search and intercept radars that will be primary targets for Turkish forces, ASEPEs are not only more flexible and survivable, but also cover incomparably larger areas and all altitude levels. From sea level to 60,000+ feet.

Reveal targets down to sea level at distances up to 200km! This feature is attributed to EriEye. For EriEye XR it is estimated to be even larger…

In other words, they essentially nullify the natural barrier of the earth’s curvature for extremely long distances, providing early warning even of incoming cruise missiles flying at low altitudes. Based on the SAAB imaging, the detection of such small-sized targets can be done at distances of 100 kilometers with the EriEye. With GlobalEye, the distance is estimated to be greater. This capability is extremely critical for Greece in light of the inclusion of SOM in large numbers in service with the Turkish forces.

These capabilities are the reason for the great commercial success of the EriEye/EriEye XR system, despite the intense American and Israeli (https://defencereview.gr/p600-aew-to-aeroskafos-egkairis-proeidopoii/) competition in it as well the space. All users of the system return to it either through its upgrade (https://defencereview.gr/i-vrazilia-parelave-to-proto-anavathmi/), or through the purchase of GlobalEye. The cooperation with the Swedes to date has been more than perfect and has not left a trace of resentment and attitudes towards vassals and not real allies.

One platform, all roles. The PS-890 Erieye had an aerial surveillance and control role initially on the SAAB 340 and SAAB 2000 turboprops. The next evolutionary step was to combine it with other mission systems. In the case of the Greek EMB-145H there are AEW&C and electronic surveillance and interception (ELINT/SIGINT/COMMINT) capabilities, while GlobalEye is a platform with full maritime surveillance and control (Maritime Surveillance) long-distance capabilities.

So the excuses are over. Funds are limited and must therefore be allocated to programs with real cost-effectiveness. Our insistence on this system is justified by all of the above. It is not vague, it is based on specific factors. So this is neither wishful thinking, nor fantastic scenarios, nor midsummer night’s dreams.

The necessary money can be saved through the cancellation or non-implementation of planned programs that reality “screams” that they have no, or that they have minimal, business value.

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