By Alexandros Drivas, Internationalist – Coordinator of the Eurasia & South East Europe Section at IDIS – Research Fellow in HALC (Hellenic American Leadership Council)
In the last 15 years, Greece has been plagued by most of the problems plaguing the Western world. Each crisis has different effects on each country, as its vulnerability to crises largely depends on its own strength. This is also a basic argument of the realist school of thought which, although it does not nullify the role of international and supranational organizations, does not overestimate their potential.
The Eurozone crisis hit Greece and other countries in the European South hardest, but then, the countries of the North had some resilience. Greece has been the victim of five major crises since 2009. Economic crisis, refugee crisis, Greek-Turkish crisis, pandemic and now, the multi-layered effects of the war in Ukraine. Given our depressing internal current affairs, the big picture of Greece is concerned with two questions which connect the inside with the outside and ultimately, constitute a fundamental and existential question for its future. Can Greece withstand its geostrategic upgrade? The EU endures a destabilization of Greece?
First of all, it is good to define an overinflated concept of days. Destabilization of a country’s political system means that country has such an uncertain political future that it easily aligns with fears of anarchy. As long as there are alternatives (democracy as a state has enormous resilience to such crises) destabilization does not obey any determinism.
Observing other European countries that, even through our current affairs, prove to be even more politically developed than Greece, we will draw the conclusion that cooperation is not only a solution but also a way out to deal with major issues. Therefore, destabilization does not come “from outside” and it is certainly not some invisible force that visits countries. Instability results from wrong political choices.
Since 2009, Greece has chosen a very smart and firmly oriented foreign policy. All governments understood that economic withering can cost much more as Turkey at that time was one of the biggest “miracles” of development. Foreign policy was rationalized and thus moved away from myths that had haunted it for a long time. The Greek-Turkish languages were boxed into regional initiatives and thus Greece became a country which realized that it is not Turkey’s “bridge” with the West but rather a bridge between the Balkans and Eastern Europe with North Africa and the Middle East.
Greece’s upgrade was supported by countries like the US and Israel precisely because their interests aligned with Greece’s. But Greece was not prepared for this upgrade as the Greek political system has not realized that the modern threats facing democracies need institutional shielding. Greece remains at low levels of resistance to hybrid threats while the lack of bureaucratic efficiency makes the country vulnerable to every malicious text that goes around the world.
Even if a security consultant were skeptical of some ghost-hunting in search of “dark centers hatching plans to destabilize the country” what he would ask, even accepting this possibility for the sake of discussion, would be: “What is the country doing about this; What are its lines of defense and how are crises handled?” The collaborations in which we have progressed can teach us ways of coping which, of course, we must adapt to our own needs. The political systems of the USA and Israel are structured so that they do not lose their momentum due to crises, whether they are internal or external.
Changing a government does not mean leveling the work of the previous one. The causes that make the Greek political system vulnerable to crises begin with the institutions themselves, which when they are not effective, perpetuate crises. Our internal affairs have become internationalized, and this internationalization gives a very bad signal not only to Turkey, but also to Greece’s allied countries who see with embarrassment a country in which they have invested enough not to have mechanisms that give guarantees that every crisis will have temporary effects and not destabilizing scenarios.
Today’s E.U. it cannot afford to have its member-states plagued by political instability before the famous winter has even arrived, which will be compared by many to the equivalents of the B’P.P. From our side, we must realize that the upgrading of a country means responsibilities and that in international politics the image of a country is very similar to life itself. Better to get your eye out than your name. This image should not be based on slogans, narratives and monotonous communication.
Arguments are needed as the lesson learned (supposedly) from the years of memos is that no one invests in a country that is considered corrupt. In such times, what ultimately matters is not to grant rights, as if there are indeed “dark centers” it makes sense for them to take advantage of it. The upgrading of Greece must be based on an institutional structure that can justify those who invest financially and geopolitically in the country. So if we want to be able to claim that we are a democracy-island of stability for the region, we need to prove it more.
